Abstract: This paper employs a new empirical approach for identifying the impact of politicians' opportunistic policy preferences on corporate tax avoidance. Our key innovation is to use turnovers of local politicians as a source of exogenous variation in tax enforcement efforts, which have strong implications for firms' strategic tax avoidance decisions. Using data on turnovers of China's municipal political leaders and industrial firms in their jurisdictions, we document cycles in corporate tax avoidance corresponding with the timing of local politician turnovers. The political cycle of tax avoidance is more pronounced in municipal cities with strong tax base and weaker governance. The cycle occurs when a local politician is younger and follows an upward career trajectory. The tax avoidance cycle is also more evident among firms that can potentially derive higher value from strategically engaging in tax avoidance activity. Our findings suggest that varying tax enforcement driven by local politicians' policy preferences is an important channel -entirely different from the political uncertainty and political connection channels -through which the political process affects real economic activity.
Introduction
Tax avoidance is a strategic corporate practice pervasive in both developed and emerging markets (e.g., Slemrod, 2004; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; and Cai and Liu, 2009 ). Firms strategically trade off the benefits and potential costs of engaging in tax avoidance activity.
This tradeoff however could be significantly influenced by politics, since politicians' opportunistic policy choices have strong implications for their tax enforcement efforts. In facing opportunistic tax enforcement efforts, firms strategically engage in tax avoidance activity to maximize their interest. This political economic perspective of tax avoidance however has not been investigated in the literature.
1 In this paper, we employ a new empirical approach to identify the impact of politicians' opportunistic policy preferences on corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, we use turnovers of China's municipal political leaders as a source of exogenous variation in tax enforcement efforts, and study how varying tax enforcement efforts affect firms' strategic tax avoidance decisions.
The motivation of our empirical study is two-fold. First, the literature on political business cycle proposes that the incumbent politicians strategically use fiscal and monetary policy instruments to maximize the probability of being re-elected (e.g., Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; and Rogoff 1990) . Empirical studies show that government spending and macroeconomic outcomes such as inflation and unemployment display cyclical patterns following the cycles of political events such as elections or government turnovers. 2 We extend this argument to tax enforcement and corporate tax avoidance by documenting a similar tax avoidance cycle corresponding to the timing of political turnovers.
Second, investigating the impact of tax enforcement efforts on corporate tax avoidance activity is unavoidably plagued by two sources of endogeneity concern: (i) excessive tax avoidance activities may trigger more enforcement efforts; and (ii) both tax avoidance and tax enforcement efforts could be affected by unobserved common factors (i.e., adverse business 1 Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2007) is a notable exception. They study an episode of increased tax enforcement in Russia following the election of Vladimir Putin. 2 For example, see Levitt, 1997; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Brender and Drazen; 2008; and Liu and Ngo, 2014. conditions). Turnovers of local politicians provide an interesting setting to resolve these two sources of endogeneity. Politicians face limited terms and may be replaced by others with different policy preferences. While tax laws remain relatively stable, the extent to which they are enforced depends on politicians' policy preferences. Political turnovers lead to shifting policy preferences, which generate plausible exogenous variation in tax enforcement efforts, and allow us to disentangle the endogeneity between tax avoidance and tax enforcement.
We use data on turnovers of China's municipal political leaders and industrial firms in these leaders' jurisdictions to examine how incentives and policy preferences faced by local politicians affect strategic corporate tax avoidance decisions. During China's reform era, local politicians have significant autonomy in economic matters. Municipal political leaders are assessed and promoted primarily based on local economic growth. Political tournaments based on economic growth push local officials to focus on measureable objectives such as GDP growth (Maskin et al., 2000; Li and Zhou, 2005; and Xu, 2011) . Local politicians, during the early period of their terms, have stronger incentives to perform well in the between region economic competition. Strengthening tax enforcement to exploiting local tax base more effectively is a convenient choice. Enhancing enforcement efforts not only generates immediate effects on fiscal revenue but also enhances local governments' borrowing capacity.
In addition, tax enforcement and tax policy adjustment give local politicians more latitude to engage in rent-seeking activity (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) .
However, strengthened tax enforcement can hardly last long. Unfavorable changes in tax enforcement may drive out investments and business activities. 3 In the regional economic competition, tax enforcement may become a bargaining tool to attract new businesses. Lax tax treatment demonstrates local government's commitment to new projects. As different regions compete on economic growth driven by new businesses and new investments, tightened enforcement may in the long run hurt local politicians' interest. Local politicians thus may choose to loosen up tax enforcement gradually. Reacting to local politicians' shifting tax enforcement efforts, firms conduct tax avoidance activity accordingly. We thus expect a tax avoidance cycle of corresponding to the timing of local political turnovers. 4 Using a hand-collected dataset of local political leaders in more than 300 municipal cities in China during 1999-2007, we examine how political turnovers affect corporate tax avoidance. A local politician typically follows a five-year term in China. However, most could not complete their terms (Landry et al., 2014) . 5 Turnovers of local politicians are largely unexpected and out of the control of any individual firm. We therefore exploit this exogenous timing of political turnovers to mitigate the potential endogeneity. Meanwhile, as
Chinese local politicians have no legislation discretion in making their own tax laws, our results are exempted from the effects of tax law modifications by local politicians.
Furthermore, turnovers of municipal political leaders take place at different points in time, allowing us to net out market-wide trends in corporate tax avoidance.
Consistent with our proposed political economic hypothesis, we find a cyclical pattern of corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, we find novel and robust evidence that firms exhibit weaker incentives to conduct tax avoidance activity in the first year of a municipal political leader's term. They however increase the extent of tax avoidance over time until the local politician is replaced by a new one.
As a further analysis, we exploit a natural experiment which generates exogenous variation in local politicians' tax enforcement efforts -the 2002 tax regulation change that significantly reduced politicians' capabilities to time tax enforcement efforts (see Section 2.2 for details). We find robust evidence that that after 2002, the political cycle of corporate tax avoidance becomes less evident. We also find that when the 2002 regulation change occurred during a politician's early (late) period of his term, firms in his jurisdiction exhibit weak (strong) incentives to avoid tax. These findings are consistent with our political economy hypothesis. 4 In a similar spirit, Huang (1996) documents a cycle of investment corresponding to the timing of political turnovers in China. Huang (1996) proposes that politicians' career concern push them to encourage more investment during the earlier period of their terms. 5 In our sample, for the period from 1999 to 2007, the average tenure of municipal political leaders (i.e., party secretaries) is 2.95 years, while the median tenure is 1.8 years, as shown in Table 2 .
To address the possibility that turnovers of municipal political leaders may be correlated with omitted variables which have implications for firms' tax avoidance activity. We analyze a refined subsample in which turnovers of local politicians are due to sudden deaths, "Shuanggui" (under investigation), or dismissal from office. 6 We conduct a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis and find that after the sudden change of a local political leader, firms operating in his jurisdiction engage less in tax avoidance. The economic effect of sudden political turnovers on tax avoidance is sizable. We find that after the sudden turnover of a local politician, firms reduce their tax avoidance level by as much as 12.3%.
While we provide robust evidence that the politics process, through the time-varying tax enforcement efforts, impact on corporate tax avoidance, we have to rule out alternative political channels. 7 Political uncertainties brought about by political turnovers may lead to a similar tax avoidance cycle too. When a new municipal political leader takes his position, firms in his jurisdiction may not know much about his policy preferences and management style. These firms hence may behave more cautiously and reduce tax avoidance. Over time, as the new leader gradually reveals his policy preferences, firms engage more in tax avoidance.
If the political uncertainty hypothesis holds, we expect the tax avoidance cycle to be less pronounced in municipal cities whose new leaders were promoted from within. However, we document a more pronounced cycle in cities whose new leaders come from inside. This evidence does not support the political uncertainty hypothesis.
Another prominent competing explanation is the political connection hypothesis.
Politically connected firms may enjoy a wide range of benefits including preferential access to external financing, government contracts, tax benefits, government subsidies, and favorable policies. However, around political turnovers, established political connections are most likely 6 "Shuanggui" is a special scheme implemented by the discipline unit of China ruling party (CCP). This practice literally means that the involved party members have to confess his wrongdoings in the specified place and during the specified time period. When "Shuanggui" happens on a certain party member, he will be placed under custody. Removal from office normally applies to officials who have committed crimes and it is a harsher penalty than "shuanggui". 7 A large and growing literature examines the effects of political or policy uncertainties on real decisions and economic outcomes. For example, Bernanke (1983) , Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007) , and Julio and Yook (2012) study the relationship between political uncertainties and real investment.
broken and it takes time to foster strong connections to the new leaders. Reducing tax avoidance is therefore a firm's natural response to lost political connections. In addition, it helps appease new leaders' desire to secure more resources. This political connection hypothesis may explain the political cycle of tax avoidance as well. However, our evidence does not support this hypothesis. In particular, when a new leader is promoted from within, firms' political connections to him still remain, we expect firms to engage in more tax avoidance during early periods of new leader's term. We find exactly the opposite.
If our political economy hypothesis holds, we should expect the magnitude of the political cycle of tax avoidance to vary with region, politician, and firm level characteristics.
It should be more evident in regions where the politicians have stronger incentives and capabilities to time enforcement efforts. It should also be more evidence among firms that can potentially derive higher value from strategically engaging in tax avoidance activity, in response to local governments' time varying enforcement efforts.
We find robust evidence. Across regions, we find that the political cycle of tax avoidance is more pronounced in municipal cities with deeper tax base (measured by local fiscal revenue over local GDP) and poorer public governance (measured by the value of marketization level scored by a given city). In both cases, the local politicians can benefit more from tightening up tax enforcements.
On a related point, we find that the age of municipal politicians and their career trajectories significantly matter. Young politicians (under 45 years old) usually have more time to climb the political hierarchy and thus, have stronger incentives to participate in the political tournament. When they approach the required retirement age (60 years old), they are less incentivized to time their efforts. Similarly, when a politician follows an upward career trajectory (i.e., he was promoted from a lower rank to the current post), he may demonstrate stronger incentives to perform as well. We find that the political cycle of corporate tax avoidance is more evidence in regions where the local politicians are young, and follow an upward career trajectory.
Within regions, we find that the effects of political turnovers on tax avoidance vary across several firm characteristics. Specifically, we document that the political cycle of tax avoidance is more pronounced for non state-owned firms, small firms, and less fiscally important firms. Furthermore, we find evidence that the tax avoidance cycle is more pronounced for less efficient firms measured by lower total factor productivity (TFP) and higher administrative expenses.
The findings in this paper have three important contributions. First, we document a new stylized fact regarding corporate tax avoidance, namely, a political cycle of corporate tax avoidance. This result demonstrates an important link between the political process and real economic activity. Our paper is thus related to a growing literature that documents the economic consequence of politics. Specifically, Julio and Yook (2012) investigates how political turnovers impact on corporate investment through the political uncertainty channel.
The literature has also documented the effects of political turnovers on initial public offering (Colak et al., 2013) , industry return volatility (Boutchkova et al., 2012) , and cash flows and stock returns (Kim et al., 2012; and Belo et al., 2013) .
Second, we provide evidence suggesting that tax enforcement efforts are associated with politicians' changing policy preferences, and hence time-varying. We thus contribute to the literature on the relation between tax enforcement and tax avoidance. 8 A major obstacle limiting empirical progress in this literature is the difficulty in identifying changes to tax enforcement efforts as truly exogenous. Tax enforcement efforts are influenced by firm behavior and developments in corporate sector. Using turnovers of municipal political leaders as a source of exogenous variation in tax enforcement efforts allow us to overcome this challenge and shed considerable light on the impact of tax enforcement on tax avoidance activity.
Third, our study adds to a large literature identifying the determinants of corporate tax 8 Not many studies directly test for the effect of tax enforcement on tax avoidance. Hoopes et al. (2012) find that U.S. public firms undertake less aggressive tax positions when tax enforcement is stricter (IRS monitoring). Gupta and Lynch (2012) examine the tax enforcement at state level and find that enhanced corporate tax enforcement results in the increase in state tax collections two years into the future. They also find that enforcement and restrictive tax policies are substitutes. DeBacker et al. (2013) find that corporations increase their tax aggressiveness after an audit for a few years and then reduce it gradually.
avoidance including corporate governance (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; and McGuire, Wang, and Wilson, 2014) , industry competition (Cai and Liu, 2009 ), financial constrains (Edwards et al., 2014) , and credit information sharing systems and higher branch penetration (Beck et al., 2014) . We find that politicians' policy preferences determine their tax enforcement efforts, which lead to a political cycle of corporate tax avoidance. On this particular point, our paper is related to Scholz and Wood (1998) , Young et al. (2001) , and Bagchi (2013) .
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background and testable hypotheses. Then Section 3 discusses data and empirical strategy, and research design. Section 4 presents our empirical findings. Section 5 provides cross-sectional evidence.
Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background and Hypotheses Development

Career paths and policy preferences of local politicians in China
The development in China during its reform era can be characterized by political centralization and economic decentralization (Xu, 2011) . Political centralization means that the ruling party (CCP) has complete control over officials at all levels within the political system. The party's cadre management system is responsible for cadre appointment and promotion decisions in both the CCP and governments at all levels. To achieve an effective control, CCP builds up branches matching different levels of the government system. At the regional level, party secretary is the highest ranked political leader and has political power higher than the highest ranked government official at the same level.
Through its organization departments at different levels, CCP applies "one-level down" appointment system (Huang 1996; Landry 2008 To advance political career, a local official needs to demonstrate his competence and political loyalty (Nathan and Gilley 2002) . During China's reform era, China's local governments have significant autonomy in economic matters (Xu, 2011) . Regional decentralization empowers local officials over economic development, public services and law enforcement within their jurisdictions. They enjoy the flexibility in enforcing laws, levying taxes, providing subsidies, and regulating competition. In addition, they directly control state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at their region. They can select the SOE managers, and significantly influence SOEs' investment and operating decisions. Local officials who can signal better outcomes of their autonomous power against their peers are likely to benefit by gaining access to the next level of political power.
Given such an institutional arrangement, local leaders compete for performance-based political promotion and GDP growth is a key performance indicator (Li and Zhou, 2005) . Shih et al. (2012) identify factional ties with various top leaders, educational qualifications, and provincial revenue collection as key factors in explaining promotion outcomes of provincial leaders. Landry (2008) extends the analysis to the prefectural level of cities, and finds that economic progress measured as GDP per capita over its value at the beginning of the appointment is positively related to promotion (locally and/or externally) of city mayors. Landry et al. (2014) further show that growth in fiscal revenue play a critical role in the promotion decisions of local officials at provincial, municipal, and county-level.
Income tax systems in China and tax enforcement
As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggest, authoritarian leaders prioritize tax collection capacity. Facing powerful incentives to perform, taxes are convenient and effective tools for local officials to obtain resources for local development. Tightened tax enforcement could be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, tightened tax enforcement brings in more fiscal revenue and quickly improves fiscal condition. On the other hand, it may push existing business to other regions. It may also drive out new investments and new projects. The negative consequences of tax enforcement efforts put local officials in a disadvantage position of regional competitions (Maskin et al., 2000) . Local officials strategically choose tax enforcement efforts to strike a careful balance between the benefits and costs of tightening up tax enforcement.
Testable hypotheses
11 Source: 21st Century Business Herald, February 1, 2013.
Political tournaments based on economic growth simply push local politicians to focus on measureable objectives such as GDP growth driven by investments, especially public sector investments. Huang (1996) documents a political cycle of real investments by showing that a region tends to make more fixed asset investments during the early period of the local politician's term. To make more investments, the local politicians, during the early period of their terms, have stronger incentives to secure enough resources for investments and economy growth. Increasing tax enforcement efforts is a natural choice. In responding to such an exogenous shock in tax enforcement, firms may strategically adjust down their extent of tax avoidance. We thus expect:
Hypothesis 1: all else equal, firms' incentives to engage in tax avoidance are weak during the early period of the municipal political leaders' terms. Especially, the level of tax avoidance is the lowest in the first year of new leaders' terms, and increases over time within their terms.
As we conjecture that a possible political cycle of tax avoidance is driven by local politicians' time-varying tax enforcement efforts resulting from their policy preferences, we expect cross-region variation in corporate tax avoidance. We have Hypothesis 2: all else equal, the political cycle of tax avoidance tends to be more evident in regions with strong fiscal capacity and poorer public governance.
We also expect the political cycle of corporate tax avoidance to be related to local politicians' personal attribute and career concerns. We expect young politicians and politicians promoted from lower ranks to demonstrate stronger incentives to excel in the political tournament for economic growth. We have Hypothesis 3: all else equal, the political cycle of corporate tax avoidance tends to be more evident in regions whose local leaders are younger and are promoted from lower ranks.
Moreover, since firms strategically conduct corporate tax avoidance activities to appease local politicians' desires for economic growth, we expect the political cycle of tax avoidance to be related to several firm specific characteristics. We conjecture that firms have stronger incentives to strategically engage in tax avoidance activity when they are small-sized, private, less important to improving local fiscal conditions, less advanced in technology, and poorly governed. We thus have 
Data and Empirical Design
Sample
Our initial Combining the aforementioned data sources, we impose the following criteria to reach the final sample: (1) there is no missing information on critical parameters including firm headquarter location, total assets, sales, the number of employees, gross value of industrial output, net value of fixed assets, firm ownership type and tax payable; (2) total assets and/or sales are greater than 1 million RMB and the number of employees is greater than 30; (3) current assets, non-current assets, total fixed assets, depreciation expense, tax payable and Industrial value added per capita are greater than zero; (4) accumulated depreciation is greater than annual depreciation expense, and tax payable is less than pre-tax profit; (5) net income deflated by total assets is within three standard deviations; (6) city-level information on GDP and fiscal revenue is not missing.
From this procedure, we obtain 1,337,323 firm-year observations and 3227 municipal city-year observations. Panel A of Table 1 
Terms of Municipal City Political Leaders
We focus our analysis on party secretaries at the municipal city level. For each local leader, we identify the date of his taking office. If the date is before July 1, then the year is counted as the first year of this politician's term. If the date is after July 1, then the first year of the politician's term is specified as the following year. We construct a dummy variable, First, which takes the value of 1 if a certain year is the first year of the local politician's term and 0 otherwise. For each local leader, we also define a variable labeled Tenure, which equals 1 for the first year of the leader's term, and accumulates on a yearly basis within the same leader's term.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that majority (70%) of 1101 local political leaders in our sample failed to complete a five-year term. Only 14% served a complete first term, and 15%
of local politicians started a second term. The longest service was 11 years. Consistent with Landry et al. (2014) , these results indicate a political process unique to the Chinese political context.
(Place Table 1 Here)
Measures of Corporate Tax Avoidance
The extent of corporate tax avoidance cannot be directly observed. Following Cai and
Liu (2009), we measure the level of tax avoidance by the sensitivity of reported profits to imputed profits based on the national income accounting. The imputed profits are obtained based on the following equation: 
∑ ∑
In the model, we use two variables to measure the tenure of local politician, First and Tenure.
We expect local political leaders to tighten up tax enforcement during the early period of their terms. First should have a positive sign (that is, β 1 > 0), indicating lower tax avoidance. If 13 As explained in Cai and Liu (2009) , the gap between RPRO and PRO comes from exogenous differences in the generally accepted accounting standards and the national income account system. The two systems have different rules on depreciation, revenue and expenses recognition. Although PRO and RPRO are legitimately different, Cai and Liu (2009) show that under certain conditions, the sensitivity of RPRO to PRO is a good proxy for the extent of tax avoidance.
there is a political cycle of tax avoidance, Tenure should have negative a sign (that is, β 1 < 0), suggesting that level of corporate tax avoidance increases with the local politicians' tenure.
We include a battery of control variables. We define effective tax rate, TAX, as income tax payable over reported pre-tax profit. The measure is set to zero for loss-making firms. In our analysis, we exclude observations with TAX greater than one. When a firm is more financially constrained, it may have stronger incentives to engage in tax avoidance activity (Edwards et al. 2014) . As suggested in Allen et al. (2005) , access to bank loans reflects a firm's ability to borrow. We compute the ratio of financial expenses to total assets (Finance), and use it as a proxy for external financing constraint. Higher financial expenses may indicate more borrowing, and thus less tight financing constraint, which consequently may reduce the firm's incentive to engage in tax avoidance activity.
We control for firm size, which is measured as the logarithm of the number of employees (Labor). While large firms have more resources to conduct tax avoidance activity (e.g. Mills et al. 1998) , they tend to draw more attentions and hence may face a higher risk of being detected. How firm size affects corporate tax avoidance is thus an empirical issue. To account for the impact of the differences in the accounting standards and the national income account system, we create a variable, Rsales, which is the ratio of sales to industrial output.
Dummy variable, SOE, takes the value of 1 if a firm is state owned and 0 otherwise. Bradshaw et al. (2013) suggest that managers of SOEs have strong incentives to pay income tax due to career concerns.
We construct three variables to account for municipal city-level characteristics. GDPG, the percentage change of GDP of the city, captures the economic condition of a certain city. Poterba (1994) finds that economic downturns and election years significantly affect state taxes and spending. When the economy is growing, the politicians have weaker incentives to tighten tax enforcement. PCHG, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there is a turnover of governor or provincial party secretary, captures the political uncertainty surrounding a certain municipal city. Facing political uncertainty, a firm may avoid more tax. We also control the tenure of mayor, the No.2 political figure in a municipal city. Moreover, we create geographical dummies at province level and year dummies.
Descriptive Statistics
We present summary statistics of key variables in value of 0.666. Our measure of effective tax rate (TAX) has a sample mean of 14.4% and a median of 5.3%, significantly less than the statutory tax rate of 33% during the sample period.
On average, our sample firms have 66 million RMB assets, 262 employees, a leverage ratio of 57.5% (total liabilities over total assets), and 7.5% of administrative expenses over total assets (Mfee). The financial expenses paid by our sample firms to total assets are on average 1.5%.
State-owned enterprises only account for 11.9% of our sample firms, the rest are non SOEs, including collective firms, domestic private firms, Hong Kong or Taiwan invested firms, and foreign firms. Rsales has a mean value of 0.964, indicating that 96.4% of total output coverts into revenues in the same year. We define Value as the natural logarithm of industrial value added per capita. Its mean is 3.843.
Panel C of Table 2 shows the patterns of fiscal revenue and corporate income tax over the terms of the local political leaders. The difference between RPRO and PRO, GAP, exhibits a cyclical pattern. GAP stands at -0.707 in the first year of the local leader's term. It decreases over time until the fifth year, suggesting that the extent of tax avoidance increases over time during the first four years of the city leader's term. The growth rate of fiscal revenue from enterprise income tax (GCTAX_GDP) reaches the peak in the second year of the city leader's term, and then decreases until the fifth year. These results provide a rough picture of varying tax enforcement by municipal cities in China.
(Place Table 2 Here)
Empirical Results
A Political cycle of corporate tax avoidance
We first test for the political cycle of corporate tax avoidance by estimating Equation (2). Column (2). The interaction of First and PRO has a significant and positive estimated coefficient of 0.0028, suggesting that the sensitivity of the reported profit to the imputed profit is higher in the first year of the local politician's term. That is, firms tend to conduct less tax avoidance activity in the first year of the local leader's tenure. This result is consistent with the political economic hypothesis.
In Column (3), Tenure is used measure the local politicians' tenures. We find that the estimated coefficient on the interactive term between Tenure and PRO is statistically significant at -0.0013. This result suggests that when the local politicians' tenures increase, firms in their jurisdictions tend to conduct more tax avoidance activity. As such, we document a political cycle of corporate tax avoidance.
It is however worth noting that the economic magnitude of either First or Tenure on tax avoidance is not impressive. Take the results reported in Column (2) Our explanation for the not so impressed economic effect is that we examine the universe of political turnovers at the municipal city level in China from 1999 to 2007. Most turnovers may have been anticipated by firms in their jurisdictions and less information is released once they are announced, which likely leads to a smaller economic effect. We defer a more detailed discussion on this point to Section 4.3, where we use a refined sub-sample to re-examine the economic magnitude of the political cycle of tax avoidance.
The results on other variables of interest are also consistent with our conjectures. The estimated coefficient on the interaction of effective tax rate and the imputed profit is negative and statistically significant. When tax rate is higher, a firm is more likely to engage in tax avoidance. Table 3 also shows that a firm's tax avoidance is positively related to external financing constraints measured by Finance. The estimated coefficient on Rsales X PRO is significantly positive. Political uncertainty of provincial leadership turnover motivates firms to engage more tax avoidance. We also find evidence that corporate tax avoidance increases when the macroeconomic condition is better since the coefficient of the interaction of GDP growth and the imputed profit is significantly negative.
In summary, the results in Table 3 document a strong negative relation between a local politician's tenure and corporate tax avoidance. We find that the intensity of tax avoidance is substantially lower during the early period of the local politician's term.
Alternative identification strategy: Regulation change on tax collection in 2002
We have document a political cycle of corporate tax avoidance in China with varying tax enforcement efforts being the driving force. We identify the effect of political process by exploiting the exogenous timing of turnovers of local politicians. The robustness of our empirical results largely depends on whether turnovers of local politicians are indeed exogenous. In this section, we exploit an exogenous change in China's tax regulation in 2002
to identify the causal effect of the political process on tax avoidance.
As we discuss in Section 2. We estimate Equation (2) by replacing Tenure with the four dummy variables. Column
(1) of Panel B of Table 4 shows that both T1 and T2 have positive impact on corporate tax avoidance measured by the sensitivity of reported profit to the imputed profit, but T34 has much weaker impact than T1 and T2 do. In Column (2), we find that the estimated coefficient on T12 X PRO is statistically significant at 0.0161 and the estimated coefficient on T34 X PRO is significant at 0.0082. The hypothesis that T12 and T34 have the same effect on corporate tax avoidance is rejected. Notably, as shown in Column (1), the estimated coefficients on T1 X PRO, T2 X PRO, and T34 X PRO decline monotonically, exhibiting a cyclical pattern in tax avoidance. This result again offers a strong support for our political economic hypothesis on corporate tax avoidance.
(Place Table 4 Here)
Alternative identification strategy: unexpected turnovers of local politicians
The success of our empirical strategy largely hinges on whether turnovers of municipal political leaders are indeed exogenous and out of the control of individual firms. As another alternative identification strategy, we consider turnovers caused by sudden death, "shuanggui" (under investigation) or sudden removals from office. We identify 22 such cases during our sample period. For these 22 episodes, the turnovers of local leaders are unexpected and hence pose exogenous shocks to firms.
We analyze this subsample. For each municipal city that has experienced an unexpected turnover, we identify a matching city in the same province. The matching city has a similar GDP level and does not experience any turnover of political leader during the period from years t-1 to t+1. 15 We conduct a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis against this sample.
Specifically, we construct two dummy variables: Change, taking the value of 1 if a municipal city has experienced an unexpected turnover of political leader (either party secretary or mayor in this analysis), and 0 otherwise; After, taking the value of 1 in year t and year t+1 and 0 in year t-1. We then estimate the following model: The control variables are the same as those in Equation (2). The variable of interest of course is β 3 . If our political economic perspective on corporate tax avoidance holds, we expect β 3 to be positive. We report the regression results in Table 5 . As shown in Column (3) and (4) (the firms in Beijing and Shanghai are excluded), the estimated values for β 3 are statistically significant at 0.0568 and 0.0548 respectively. This result suggests that after the sudden change of a local political leader, firms operating in his jurisdiction engage less in tax avoidance.
Unlike the results reported in Table 3 , the economic effect of sudden political turnovers on tax avoidance is sizable. Take the results in Column (3) as the example. When all independent variables take their means value, the reported profit (RPRO) would increase by roughly 0.46 if the imputed profit increases by 1. β 3 is estimated at 0.0568, suggesting that the responsiveness of the reported profit to imputed profit increase by 0.0568 after the sudden turnover of local political leaders. This represents a 12.3% increase from its previous level.
(Place Table 5 Here)
Competing Explanations
There are several competing explanations for the identified political cycle of tax avoidance. The political uncertainty hypothesis is one of them. Based on this argument, around turnovers of political leaders, political uncertainty becomes relevant for firms' strategic tax avoidance decision. As firms are not aware of new leaders' preferences and management style, they become more cautious and engage less in tax avoidance activity.
Over time, firms get to know new political leaders better and political uncertainty gradually resolves, firms engage more in tax avoidance. Clearly, this political uncertainty aspect can also explain the documented cycle in corporate tax avoidance.
Political connection is another competing explanation. Politically connected firms are able to enjoy various tax benefits and therefore engage more in tax avoidance activity. After the turnovers, Firms need to rebuild connections to the new leader, which obviously takes time. If the political connection argument holds, we would expect firms to engage less in tax avoidance during the early period of the local politician's term, and gradually improve the level of tax avoidance.
To differentiate our political economic hypothesis from both the political uncertainty and the political connection hypotheses, we examine the behavior of political leaders who were promoted internally. If a political leader had worked in the same city, local firms may know him/her better. All else equal, political uncertainty will be less a concern. If the political uncertainty argument is true, we would expect that the cyclical pattern of tax avoidance to be less evident for firms whose local politicians were promoted internally.
We divide our sample into two sub-samples. One consists of firms whose local politicians were promoted internally; and the other consists of the rest of firms. We examine whether the cyclical pattern of corporate tax avoidance varies across the two sub-samples. As shown in Table 6 , we find that the political cycle of tax avoidance is more evident for firms whose leaders were promoted internally. This result is inconsistent with the political uncertainty hypothesis, which suggests that those firms should engage more in tax avoidance activity.
The results reported in Table 6 do not support the political connection hypothesis either, simply because we find that all else equal, firms with local leaders promoted from within engage less in corporate tax avoidance activity.
(Place Table 6 Here)
Alternative measure of tax avoidance
Throughout our analysis, we use the responsiveness of reported profit to imputed profit as a measure of the extent of tax avoidance. Many studies use effective tax rate to measure tax avoidance (e.g. Dyreng et al. 2008) . In Table 7 , we use Tax as a proxy for tax avoidance. Tax is defined as income tax payable deflated by pre-tax profit. In Column (1), the estimated coefficient of First is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that effective tax rate is higher in the first year of a local leader's term. Column (2) shows that Tenure is negatively associated with effective tax rate. These results offer further evidence on the political cycle of corporate tax avoidance.
(Place Table 7 Here)
Cross Section Variation and Further Discussion
Regional differences -the effects of fiscal capacity and public governance
We hypothesize that the political cycle of tax avoidance is driven by local politicians' time-varying tax enforcement efforts resulting from their policy preferences. We thus expect that in regions with strong fiscal capacity and lower level of public governance, the local politicians have stronger incentives to strategically managing tax enforcement efforts (Hypothesis 2).
We measure a region's fiscal capacity using the ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP in year t-1 (one year before the new leader took office). The higher the ratio, the weaker the fiscal capacity the city has. We divide our sample into two subsamples by the median ratio, and compare the effects of the political process on tax avoidance across the two subsamples.
Columns (1)- (4) (3) and (4), also shows that the political cycle of tax avoidance is more evident in cities with strong fiscal capacity.
Public governance also matters. In better governed regions, local politicians face more checks and balances and have smaller room to time their enforcement efforts. We thus expect the political cycle of tax avoidance to be more evident in poorly governed regions. We use the value of marketization index at the province level to measure the level of public governance.
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We divide our sample into two equally sized subsamples based on the median value of this index. If a city is from a province with the index value higher (lower) than median, it is classified into the high (low) marketization group. We compare the two groups and report the results in Columns (5)- (8) of Table 8 . We find consistent results that the political cycle of tax avoidance is more evident in cities with poor public governance (that is, low marketization score).
(Place Table 8 Here)
The Effects of Age and Career Concerns
We hypothesize that the political cycle of corporate tax avoidance is more pronounced in regions where local leaders have stronger incentives to time the enforcement efforts to pursue their policy goals. We expect young politicians and politicians promoted from lower ranks to demonstrate such incentives (Hypothesis 3).
We first examine the age of a local politician. If a local leader is younger than 45 years old, he is regarded as a junior chief. As he still has upward potentials, he may have stronger incentives to time the enforcement efforts. On the contrary, a leader older than 45 years old, that is, a senior chief, may demonstrate weaker incentives.
We also examine the career path of a local leader. If he is promoted from a lower rank, the promotion itself may provide stronger incentive for him/her to excel in the political tournament for economic growth. The political cycle of corporate tax avoidance may be more pronounced in his jurisdiction. In a contrast, if a leader's current post has the same rank as his previous post, he very likely does not have incentives as strong as those promoted leaders. Table 9 reports our regression results. Columns (1) - (4) show that younger leaders have 16 See Fan et al. (2010) for detailed description about how the marketization index is compiled.
more influence on the cyclical pattern of tax avoidance. Columns (5) - (8) show that the promoted leaders have stronger influence on the cyclical pattern of corporate tax avoidance than those non promoted leaders do. Take the results in Columns (5) and (6) as the example.
The estimated coefficient on First X PRO is statistically significantly at 0.0095 the coefficient of the interaction between First and the imputed profit (PRO) is 0.0095 the promoted group, while it is 0.0024 for the non promoted group. The former has a much larger magnitude than the latter.
(Place Table 9 Here)
The effects of firm level characteristics
While local politicians opportunistically time their tax enforcement efforts to pursue their policy goals, firms adjust their levels of tax avoidance strategically as well. We thus expect firm level characteristics to have strong influence on the political cycle of tax avoidance, especially when they are associated with firms' incentives or capability to strategically engage in tax avoidance activity.
We hypothesize that firms have stronger incentives to engage in tax avoidance activity strategically when they are small, private, and less important to local tax base. SOEs are more transparent than non-SOEs because the local government can appoint or remove the executives of local SOEs. Thus these managers pay more taxes to achieve career promotion (Bradshaw et al., 2013) . Meanwhile, the benefits from tax avoidance do not directly go to SOE managers.
We thus expect SOEs demonstrate weaker incentives to engage in tax avoidance activity.
Columns (1) and (2) of both panels in Table 10 , where First and Tenure are used respectively to capture a politician's political term, show supporting results. The political cycle of tax avoidance is more pronounced among non-SOEs.
We then examine the effect of a firm's importance to local tax base. When a firm's income tax payable over city-level fiscal revenue is higher than the median value of our sample, we regard the firm as a tax important firm. Otherwise, it is classified as a non tax important firm. We expect tax important firms to demonstrate weaker incentives to strategically engage in tax avoidance, as they are likely under the scrutiny of local tax authority due to their importance. Columns (3) and (4) of both panels report the results.
Indeed, we find that the political cycle of corporate tax avoidance is less pronounced among the tax important firms.
Next, we compare large firms with small firm. We use natural logarithm of the number of employees to measure firm size. When the size of a firm is larger than the sample median, we classify it as large firm; it is a small firm otherwise. Columns (5) and (6) present results.
Clearly, the political cycle of corporate tax avoidance is much more evident among small firms.
(Place Table 10 Here) We also hypothesize that firm level efficiency matters. We use two efficiency measures.
The first is total factor productivity (TFP) , defined as the residuals of the following equation:
Value is the natural logarithm of industrial value added per capita; Labor is the natural logarithm of the number of employees; and PPE is plant, property, and equipment. We rank a firm's TFP in the year prior to new leader taking office. If a firm has TFP higher than the sample median, we regard it as a high productivity firm. Otherwise, it is classified as a low productivity firm. Our second measure of efficiency is firm level administrative expenses over total assets in the year prior to new leader taking office. We classify high efficiency and low efficiency firms accordingly. Table 11 presents the results of comparing the high efficiency firms with the low efficiency firms. We find quite robust results that firms with lower efficiency level have stronger incentives to engage in strategic tax avoidance.
(Place Table 11 Here)
Conclusion
In this study, we propose a political economic perspective to understand corporate tax avoidance activity. Using data on exogenous turnovers of Chinese municipal political leaders and the industrial firms in their jurisdictions, we document a political cycle of corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that firms demonstrate weaker incentives to engage in tax avoidance activity during the early period of the local politician' term. They increase tax avoidance over time until the current leader is replaced by a new leader. We argue that local politicians who time their tax enforcement efforts to achieve their preferred policy goals drive the cyclical pattern in tax avoidance. We also find that the magnitude of the political cycle of tax avoidance varies with different region, politician, and firm characteristics. The tax avoidance cycle is more pronounced in municipal cities with stronger tax base and weak public governance. It is more evident in cities whose local politicians are younger and are promoted from a lower rank. Moreover, we find that the political cycle of tax avoidance is more evident among private firms, less fiscally important firms, smaller firms, and less efficient firms. For these firms, the value derived from strategical tax avoidance in response to local politicians' policy preferences is likely much higher.
We find that the effects of political process on corporate tax avoidance are economically meaningful, and the mechanism -entirely different from the political uncertainty and the political connection channels -suggests a new consideration in assessing the impact of politicians' policy preferences on corporate decisions and understanding the determinants of tax avoidance. (1)- (4), we use the ratio of a city's fiscal revenue over local GDP before the political turnover to sort the sample into two subsamples. If the ratio is higher than the median value, a city is viewed as a low capacity city, and vice verse. In Columns (5)- (8) 
